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　　IN THE HIGH COURT OF

　　SOUTH AFRICA

　　(EASTERN CAPE,

　　GRAHAMSTOWN)

　　Case No: 607/2010

　　In the matter between:

　　ANTONIE LE ROUX

　　.........................................................................................Applicant

　　And

　　H. PIETERSE N.O

　　..................................................................................1st

　　Respondent

　　THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC

　　PROSECUTIONS

　　EASTERN CAPE

　　...................................................................................2nd

　　Respondent

　　TERENCE NEWBURY PRICE

　　...............................................................3rd

　　Respondent

　　CHRISTO SWANEPOEL

　　........................................................................4th

　　Respondent

　　Coram: Chetty and

　　Beshe JJ

　　Heard: 21 September

　　2012

　　Delivered: 27

　　September 2012

　　Summary: Review

　　– Application for review in terms of section 24 of the

　　Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 – Gross

　　irregularity – Admission of inadmissible hearsay –

　　Documentary hearsay – Representation of fact –

　　J88

　　admissible in terms of section 34 of the Civil Proceedings

　　Evidence Act 25 of 1965 – Application dismissed

　　___________________________________________________________________

　　JUDGMENT

　　Chetty, J

　　[1] The applicant was

　　arraigned for trial in the Regional Court, Humansdorp,

　　on a charge of raping the

　　complainant, a 15 year old female, an offence falling within the

　　purview of section 51 (1) of the Criminal

　　Law Amendment Act1.

　　The applicant, who was legally represented by the third respondent,

　　duly instructed by the fourth respondent, (his

　　instructing attorney), pleaded

　　not guilty to the charge and, in

　　a prolix written plea explanation tendered, ostensibly pursuant to

　　the provisions of section 115 (2) of the Criminal

　　Procedure Act (the

　　Act)2,

　　denied, not

　　only having raped the complainant, but

　　that sexual intercourse with her in fact occurred. After the

　　adduction of evidence from various witnesses, including the

　　complainant,

　　the applicant and his witnesses, the magistrate,

　　after several lengthy

　　delays, duly convicted the applicant of rape on 1 October 2008. The

　　matter was postponed for sentence to 15

　　December 2008 and the

　　applicant’s bail extended.

　　[2] The applicant

　　thereafter, for reasons which I shall in due course advert to,

　　terminated the services of both the third and fourth

　　respondents and

　　appointed others in their stead. This precipitated further delays.

　　Although the evidence was transcribed during

　　the trial and a running

　　record generated, a portion of the judgment, for reasons not germane

　　to this judgment, could not be retrieved

　　from the computing system

　　and had to be reconstructed by the first respondent from his draft

　　judgment. On 1 February 2010, the

　　reconstructed judgment was handed

　　down and the matter postponed to 13 April 2010 for sentence.

　　[3] On 4 March 2010,

　　prior to the sentencing stage of the criminal proceedings, the

　　applicant filed this application in which the

　　relief sought was

　　articulated thus:-

　　“(a)

　　Reviewing and setting aside all the proceedings in case no. RC24/06,

　　including the conviction on 1.10.2008 of the Applicant

　　on a charge of

　　rape, held before the First Respondent in the Regional Court for the

　　Regional Division of the Eastern Cape, sitting

　　in Humansdorp and

　　later in Port Elizabeth;

　　(b) Ordering such of

　　the Respondents as may oppose this application, to pay the costs

　　thereof;

　　(c) Such further or

　　alternative relied as to the (sic) above Honourable Court may

　　deem appropriate.”

　　[4] In his founding

　　affidavit, the gravamen of the applicant’s case is articulated

　　as follows:-

　　“24.

　　In what follows, I intend to show (a) that a gross irregularity

　　(within the meaning of section 24(1)(c) of the Supreme Court

　　Act.

　　of 1959), alternatively, the admission of inadmissible

　　evidence (within the meaning of section 24(1)(d) of the aforesaid

　　Act),

　　occurred in the proceedings; (b) that the Third and Fourth

　　Respondents did not act in my best interest and that I did therefore

　　not have proper representation at the trial; and (c) in general, that

　　I did not have a fair trial.”

　　[5] It will be gleaned

　　from the aforegoing that the application is predicated upon the

　　provisions of section 24 of the Supreme

　　Court Act3

　　and in particular

　　subsections 1 (c) and (d) which provide as follows:-

　　“24 

　　Grounds of review of proceedings of inferior courts

　　(1) The grounds upon

　　which the proceedings of any inferior court may be brought under

　　review before a provincial division, or before

　　a local division

　　having review jurisdiction, are-

　　    (a)   .

　　. .

　　    (b)   .

　　. .

　　   (c)   gross

　　irregularity in the proceedings; and

　　(d)   the

　　admission of inadmissible or incompetent evidence or

　　the rejection of

　　admissible or competent evidence.”

　　[6] Although the grounds

　　of review, are,

　　rather inelegantly, in paragraph 24 of the founding affidavit framed

　　in the alternative, they are in essence interrelated and

　　constitute a

　　single ground of review and relate to the admission of a medico-legal

　　report, the J88, completed by Dr Louise

　　du Toit at

　　the local hospital during the examination of the complainant on 7

　　April 2005. The second and third grounds of review, the fair

　　trial

　　complaints, are however rooted in the provisions of section 35 (3) of

　　the Constitution4.

　　[7] The application is

　　opposed by the second and third respondents, the first and fourth

　　respondents abiding the decision of this

　　court. Although the third

　　respondent initially filed a notice of opposition and subsequently an

　　affidavit wherein the extent of

　　his opposition to the application as

　　such was circumscribed, he

　　nonetheless emphatically refuted any suggestion that his

　　representation of the applicant was anything other than exemplary.

　　The alleged

　　irregularity

　　[8] In order to place the

　　argument advanced on behalf of the applicant in proper perspective it

　　is necessary to firstly consider

　　the circumstances under which the

　　offending medico-legal report, the J88, was introduced into the

　　proceedings and thereafter to

　　determine its admissibility. It is

　　common cause that upon the complainant’s admission to the local

　　hospital on the morning

　　of 7 April 2005, she was attended to and

　　examined by Dr du

　　Toit, who

　　completed the J88 and appended her signature thereto. During the

　　trial, it emerged that Dr du

　　Toit had

　　emigrated to Australia and the J88 was, after

　　much debate5,

　　provisionally handed in

　　as exhibit “C”.

　　[9] After the adduction

　　of evidence by the complainant, Ms Jonker

　　and Inspector Pietersen,

　　the state recalled the complainant and further cross-examination

　　ensued. Prior to the next witness being called, the prosecutor

　　informed the magistrate that on reflection, the submissions

　　previously made by him concerning the admissibility of the J88

　　pursuant

　　to the provisions of section 212 (4) of the Act were wrong

　　and contended that its admissibility had properly to be determined in

　　terms of what he colloquially referred to as the hearsay Act, in

　　truth, the Law

　　of Evidence Amendment Act6.

　　After much discussion between the magistrate, the prosecutor and the

　　third respondent, the following exchange occurred7

　　between the trial

　　magistrate and the third respondent:-

　　“MNR

　　PRICE:

　　U Edele my instruksies is om oop kaarte met die hof te speel. Ek gaan

　　niks weerhou van die hof nie. Ek wil hê die hof moet

　　alles

　　sien. Daar gaan blykbaar ‘n ander dokter kom getuig oor sy

　　opinie oor daardie verslag. Laat hom kom getuig. Ek dink

　　daar is baie

　　belangrike vrae wat gevra moet word oor daardie verslag, so ek het

　　nie beswaar nie, maar natuurlik die beslissing

　　lê nog steeds by

　　u.

　　HOF: So ek (sic)

　　het nie beswaar dat hy dan inkom nie, maar (tussenkoms)

　　MNR PRICE: Wel,

　　die waarde daarvan sal ons later maar seker oor betoog, maar ek is in

　　u hande U Edele, u moet die beslissing maak, nie ek

　　nie.

　　HOF: “Okay”

　　maar kom ons stel dit so – jy aanvaar die feite en die goed

　　soos daar is ‘n skeur gekry.

　　MNR PRICE: Ek

　　aanvaar dat wat sy daar skryf het sy gekry.

　　HOF: Maar die

　　interpretasie daarvan.

　　MNR PRICE: “A

　　tear is ... daar is soveel verskillende meanings vir “tear”

　　– ek het ‘n hele boekie daaroor.

　　HOF: Ja-nee ek

　　weet.

　　MNR PRICE: So

　　ja, wat daar staan is wat sy daar geskryf het.

　　HOF: Maar die

　　feit is jy gaan erken die skeur is gekry.

　　MNR PRICE: Wel,

　　ek kan nie erken dat ‘n skeur gekry is nie. Ek kan erken dat

　　daar fout gekry is. Jy sien dit is die interpretasie van

　　wat presies

　　die woord “tear” beteken. Die mediese “jurisprudence”

　　hieroor is wyd, maar ek sal in my vrae

　　aan die dokter dit duidelik

　　vir u maak U Edele wat ek bedoel daarmee. Dit is moeilik vir ons,

　　want ek meen daar is soveel vrae

　　wat ek graag daardie dokter wou

　　geroep . . . vra.

　　HOF: Dan gaan ek

　　maar die ding steeds in die lig laat hang Mnr die Aanklaer.”

　　[10] This exchange

　　ushered in the testimony of Dr Wiese,

　　a medical officer attached to the Kouga hospital, where the

　　complainant had been examined by Dr du

　　Toit.

　　During his evidence in chief he was referred to the J88 and

　　identified both the handwriting and signature thereon as that of Dr

　　du Toit.

　　It is

　　not in dispute that the latter in fact authored the J88. In his

　　founding affidavit, the applicant contends that “for

　　the [p]rosecutor to have tendered the evidence of Dr. Wiese,

　　based solely on the inadmissible hearsay evidence contained in the

　　J88 (exhibit C), amounted to a gross irregularity”.

　　It will be gleaned from the aforegoing that the irregular act

　　complained of is directly attributed to the prosecutor and not the

　　magistrate. There may well be cases where an irregular act by another

　　court official constitutes a gross irregularity and hence

　　subject to

　　review, but

　　this is clearly not the case here. The mere calling of a witness to

　　testify can never per

　　se amount

　　to an irregularity.

　　[11] The confusion

　　concerning the proper basis upon which the admissibility of the J88

　　had to be determined continued during argument.

　　In his judgment the

　　magistrate considered the validity of the submission that the J88 was

　　inadmissible hearsay. In rejecting the

　　argument advanced he reasoned

　　that whilst the opinion expressed by and recorded by Dr du

　　Toit was

　　inadmissible unless she testified, her factual findings were not and

　　were admissible in evidence. Although not specifically

　　adverted to in

　　the judgment is implicit from his reasons, wherein

　　he stated, -

　　“Die

　　verdediging voer dan aan dat Dr du Toit se mediese verslag op hoorse

　　getuienis neerkom en daar dus nie mediese getuienis oor

　　die kwessie

　　voor my is nie. Du Toit se deskundigheid word ook in twyfel getrek.

　　Haar

　　opinie is beslis nie toelaatbaar nie maar bogenoemde dit wat sy gekry

　　het is objektief vasstelbare feite.

　　Die

　　verdediging het aanvaar dat daar geen probleme met die

　　kettinggetuienis is nie.” (emphasis

　　supplied)

　　that the avenue of

　　admissibility which the magistrate had in mind was the scenario

　　postulated by section 34 (1) of Part VI of the

　　Civil

　　Proceedings Evidence Act8.

　　(The provisions of

　　sections 33 – 38 inclusive of the aforementioned Act applies,

　　mutatis

　　mutandis,

　　to criminal proceedings

　　by virtue of section 222 of the Act). This

　　alternate avenue of admissibility9

　　was never specifically

　　raised nor considered in the court below nor for that matter, by the

　　parties in their heads of argument until

　　I raised the issue during

　　the hearing. Mr Wessels’ response was that the J88 remained

　　inadmissible by reason of the fact

　　that Dr du

　　Toit could

　　not be cross-examined. There is no substance in the argument.

　　[12] To my mind the crux

　　of the admissibility issue falls to be determined by section 34 (1)

　　which reads as follows:-

　　“34 

　　Admissibility of documentary evidence as to facts in issue

　　(1) In any civil

　　proceedings where direct oral evidence of a fact would be admissible,

　　any statement made by a person in a document

　　and tending to establish

　　that fact shall on production of the original document be admissible

　　as evidence of that fact, provided-

　　   (a)   the

　　person who made the statement either-

　　(i)   had

　　personal knowledge of the matters dealt with in the statement; or

　　(ii)  where

　　the document in question is or forms part of a record purporting to

　　be a continuous record, made the statement

　　(in so far as the matters

　　dealt with therein are not within his personal knowledge) in the

　　performance of a duty to record information

　　supplied to him by a

　　person who had or might reasonably have been supposed to have

　　personal knowledge of those matters; and

　　    (b)   the

　　person who made the statement is called as a witness in the

　　proceedings unless he is dead or unfit by reason

　　of his bodily or

　　mental condition to attend as a witness or is outside the Republic,

　　and it is not reasonably practicable to secure

　　his attendance or all

　　reasonable efforts to find him have been made without success.”

　　[13] It is not in issue

　　that Dr du

　　Toit completed

　　the J88. Dr Wiese’s

　　unchallenged evidence was

　　that the J88 reflected both her handwriting and signatures. The

　　complainant herself testified that she

　　was taken to the hospital

　　where she was examined by Dr du

　　Toit.

　　As the author of the contents of the J88, Dr du

　　Toit thus

　　had personal knowledge of the matters dealt with therein. It is

　　common cause that at the trial, Dr

　　du Toit

　　had since emigrated to

　　Australia and there can be no question that it would not have been

　　reasonably practicable to secure her attendance

　　at the trial. Had she

　　testified, her

　　evidence concerning the observations which she recorded in the J88

　　would have been admissible in evidence. Consequently, there

　　being

　　compliance with the prescripts of section 34 (1) of the Act, the J88

　　was, on production, admissible as evidence of the facts

　　thereon

　　contained viz, that the complainant’s panties were torn and

　　that her vagina exhibited a small tear at the 12 o’clock

　　position.

　　[14] Counsel for the

　　applicant’s reliance on the judgment of Mthiyane J.A in

　　Swanepoel

　　v The State10

　　as authority for the

　　proposition that the J88 was inadmissible by virtue of Dr du

　　Toit’ not

　　having been called to testify, is entirely misplaced as the reference

　　to R

　　v Miller11

　　therein clearly shows. In

　　Swanepoel

　　the learned Judge of

　　Appeal drew a clear distinction between statements tendered for their

　　testimonial value and those tendered

　　for their circumstantial value.

　　It is explicit from the court below’s judgment that the J88 was

　　admitted, not

　　for its testimonial value, but

　　as a statement of the objective facts found by Dr du

　　Toit.

　　The complainant herself testified that her panties were torn and that

　　she had a tear on her private parts. It moreover appears

　　from the

　　magistrate’s judgment that Mr Maurice

　　Wentzel,

　　who compiled exhibit “G” described the complainant’s

　　panties as having been torn. Both the report (save for

　　the last page)

　　and the panties were lost and could not be retrieved. Although Mr

　　Price

　　sought to extract an

　　admission from the complainant that she had been appraised of the

　　tear on her private parts by Dr du

　　Toit,

　　the affirmative answer to that and the following question posed –

　　“Ek

　　meen u weet nie daarvan nie” is

　　ambivalent. Contextually read, the distinct impression to be gleaned

　　from her evidence was that she had personal knowledge of

　　the injury,

　　and no others,

　　as she immediately

　　thereafter conceded. In my judgment therefor the J88 is admissible

　　under section 34 (1) of the Act.

　　[15] Consequently, the

　　fair trial complaint falls away and cannot be sustained. In any event

　　the applicant’s aspersions on

　　the competency of the third

　　respondent is baseless and without any foundation. The transcript of

　　the proceedings proves the exact

　　opposite. Is the third respondent

　　nonetheless entitled to a costs order in his favour? Although an

　　injurious insinuation concerning

　　the professional

　　competence/integrity of a legal practitioner is serious and invites a

　　response, the third respondent refuted the

　　allegations levelled

　　against him and begs the question why he considered it necessary to

　　brief counsel to appear at the hearing.

　　The issue which fell for

　　determination was the admissibility of the J88 and not the third

　　respondent’s competence. In my

　　view, it was unnecessary for the

　　third respondent to have briefed counsel and those costs should be

　　borne by himself.

　　[16] In the result the

　　following order will issue:-

　　The application is

　　dismissed.

　　________________________

　　D. CHETTY

　　JUDGE OF THE HIGH

　　COURT

　　Beshe, J

　　I agree.

　　________________________

　　N. G BESHE

　　JUDGE OF THE HIGH

　　COURT

　　On behalf of the

　　Applicant: Adv Wessels instructed by Wheeldon Rushmere & Cole,

　　119 High Street, Grahamstown, Tel: (046) 622

　　7005; Ref: van der Veen

　　On behalf of the 1st

　　Respondent: Adv Els, Director of Public Prosecutions, Grahamstown,

　　Tel: (046) 602 3000

　　On behalf of the 3rd

　　Respondent: Adv Pienaar / Adv Ronaasen instructed by Nettletons

　　Attorney, 118A High Street, Grahamstown, Tel: (046) 622 7149; Ref:

　　Mr

　　Cloete

　　1Act

　　No 105 of 1997

　　2Act

　　No 51 of 1977

　　3Act

　　No. 59 of 1959

　　4The

　　Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No, 1996

　　5It

　　is unnecessary to burden this judgment with the competing

　　submissions advanced by the state and the third respondent for it

　　is

　　entirely irrelevant to a determination of the legal issue which

　　falls for decision.

　　6Act

　　No, 45 of 1988

　　7Record

　　volume 1, page 95-96

　　8Act

　　No, 25 of 1965

　　9A

　　term used by Brand J.A in Giesecke & Devrient Southern Africa

　　(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Safety and Security 2012 (2) 137 (SCA)

　　at

　　para [28]

　　10; (SCA)

　　11